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RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
AS A DEVELOPING FACTOR IN PERSONALITY

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTERS PAGE

Introduction 1-6
A. The Present Dilemma 1
B. Solution 3
C. Summary 5

I The Nature of Experience 7-17
A. Meaning of the term 'Experience' 7
B Structure of Experience 7
C. Process of Experiencing 10
D. The Self a Governing Factor 12
E. Experience and Knowledge 15
F. Summary 16

II Religious Experience 18-30
A. Meaing of 18
B. Religious Experience Distinguished 20
C. The Object of Religious Experience 23
D. Religious Experience as Mystical 25
E. Religion a Value-Experience 27
F. Conclusion 29

III Religious Experience and Personality 31-46
A. Statement of the Thesis 31
B. Development of Personality 31
C. Personality an Organization 34
D. Personality and Purpose 35
E. Personality and Values 37
F. God and Personality 39
G. Religious Experience and the Development of Personality 42
H. Summary 45

IV Conclusion 47-52
A. Application 47
B. Personal Religion 48
C. Social Religion 50
D. Summary 51

Notes 53-54

Bibliography 55-57

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

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INTRODUCTION

A. The Present Dilemma

Emmerson's saying, "Things are in the saddle and ride mankind," was never more true than it is today. The immense and marvelous progress we have made during the past hundred years has been mainly in mechanical science and industry. This advancement should have aided man's progress in the development of his spiritual life, but the reverse seems to be the truth. We might have expected a new cultivation of man's inner or spiritual life; the flowering of a finer, freer fellowship of kindred minds and souls. We might have expected a deeper and more adequate appreciation and enjoyment of nature, art, letters, science, philosophy, and religion. But our highly developed urban life has not given us what one might expect.

In the place of all this we have found that the machine and material prosperity of today has encased the mind of man until now he finds no real values for or in life. The western mind seems to be held by two large obsessions; the enjoyment of rapid motion to no goal, and the the greater possession of material things. Instead of developing machines to do his bidding man is tending to become the slave of his machines. Leighton, in the postscript to his book Man and the Cosmos, seems to feel that man has become so engrossed in his material advancement that now "everything fine in our industrial democracy is being endangered by mass inpulses, mass appetites, mass imagery and quantity production to feed the mediocre

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mass soul. The standards of education, thought, scholarship, taste, and character are low. In fact it can scarcely be said that any standards obtain general recognition. There is little reverence for the past or for the finer things in life; there is widespread lack of moral courage, of mental sanity and rational self-control, or self-reliant spiritual character. We may be going fast towards a thoroughly mechanistic barbarism, varied by anarchial outbursts of primitive impulses."[1]

Many people today like to look upon our present troubled state as being due to the Great War. It is true that a war is apt to have a great effect upon the thinking of men, but the Great War was the result of the same forces which we find operating in society today. The Great War was supposed to have been a war to end wars, but war has not and cannot cure social ills. The forces that led to the outbreak of the war in 1914 are at work once again in our society and we are now facing a "war machine" that only too easily can and will be set into operation.

Along with our advancement in material and industrial prosperity has come into prominence that type of thinking which aids rather than checks the reverence of material things. This has resulted in a mechanistic-materialistic philosophy of life. Although this philosophy has aided the scientific spirit of man to push on to greater heights it has also led psychology to look for the secrets of man's nature in his overt behavior. Starting from the outside, and remaining on the outside, psychologists and philosophers are now trying to explain to us the nature of man. They find man, on the outside, to belong to the animal kingdom and thus, they say, he belongs to the realm of nature and of nature alone. They do not find, in studying man from the outside, any place where man can and does rise above his animal nature. Man is left just where he is found, and when all their philosophizing

is finished we are none the richer, and, too frequently, none the wiser.

Perhaps I should pause here and state that I am not opposed to scientific advancement nor am I opposed to the development of material resorces. What I am opposed to is our allowing this advancement to go on at the cost of personal happiness and character. I agree with James Henry Breasted in saying that "the most pressing need of America at the present critical juncture is not more mechanisation but more character." I am in deep sympathy with every desire and effort of men for finer, richer, and more harmonious lives. But this finer civilization, this richer and happier life of man, will not be brought to pass simply by the increase of material production. Even though the distribution of the products of our industries be more nearly equalized the problem will in no measure be fully solved.

B. Solution

One might well ask, Where does the solution of the problem lie? You have mentioned character, but just how do you propose to build this character?

I intend to answer these questions, not by turning to the material world in and with which man lives, but by pointing out that the solution lies in the very nature of man as man. Man is not merely a machine that can be adjusted to an environment, man is the adjustor. Man is not simply the result of social, economic, and cultural forces, he is --- man is not left alone in all this --- the determiner of his social, economic, and cultural forces. Man is thus a creature who is capable, not only of making this world a better place in which to live, but he is capable of making his life richer, fuller, and of greater value.

We must here include man's religion for, as Brightman has pointed

out, religion is, first of all, "the belief that to be a man is to be capable of salvation; that is, capable of a better life, a life that the believer describes as a redeemed, or holy, or saintly, or blessed. ..... Whatever else the problem of religion may be, it is at least the problem of man --- of man's purpose, man's value, man's destiny, 'man's place in the cosmos.'"[2] What, then, is man?

When we look about for a single term with which to define man we are always brought to the word 'person' or 'personality' as the best description of man. But 'person' like the word 'man' needs further definition. Can we say that a person is an organism? Yes, a person is an organism, but he is a special and distinctive kind of an organism. A person is a self-conscious organism, he is a self-experiencing being, a subject-object.

This self-conscious organism, or person, or personality, possesses unity. It is this principle of unity which is essential to knowledge. If the person did not possess the power of unifying his experiences he would be unable to know that the experience of the moment belonged to any system of experiences. "To be a real unity," writes Professor Buckham, "the self must have a certain degree of continuity, so that the perceptions of a given instant may be correlated to past perceptions. The mere transference of the perceptions of one moment on to the next would not constitute such a unity but only a continually dying and reviving thought-series. The very span of memory --- a span in which the intensity of early impressions often increases rather than diminshes with its length --- disproves a discontinuous selfhood."[3]

Another essential to the organism's being a person is the fact that he is free. He possesses freedom. Were he not free man would not be a person but merely a mechanism. The evidence for this freedom is man's own consciousness of his being free. Now this freedom is limited and were man not

limited in his freedom he would indeed not be free. The limitation of man's freedom is found in his nature, or heredity, and in his environment. Were it not for the fixed nature of these two factors man would find no ordered sphere in which to assert his freedom --- his freedom of choice, action, and self-direction or self-development.

The fourth of possession of a personality is worth. Every personality has worth, intrinsic worth, worth in himself and not merely worth for a purpose. As Professor Buckham has stated, "inestimable worth inheres in a person in that he is an end in himself. As Aristotle had it, he is an entelechy. To be sure he does not exist for himself alone, nor by himself. The person is a socius, and finds himself only in relation with other persons. Personality is in its very nature relatedness, and yet, uniqueness."[4] Thus we see that a person is a truly moral being.

C. Summary

We thus find that a person is a unified self-conscious, free, self-determining end in himself. Now the person is not born as such, he develops. A baby is born an individual but not a person. The baby is only a promise to be a person. The individual becomes a person when he enters into the moral realm --- only when he takes his place among moral beings. No one who recognizes no obligation outside himself is a person.

This passing from the realm of mere individuals into the realm of personality cannot be fully accomplished without a divine movement upon or within the individual. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that an adequate religious experience, whether known as such or not, is a true developing factor in the passing from the realm of the simple self into the realm of persons. To show this we must examine into the nature of

religious experience. We shall begin by examining the nature of experience in general. After determining the nature of experience we shall apply the findings to that phase of human experience called religious, and then note how religious experience aids in the development of human personality.

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF EXPERIENCE

A. Meaning of the term 'Experience'

'Experience' is indeed a 'weasel word' and, as Whitehead has said, "one of the most deceitful in philosophy." When one begins to look for an adequate definition or formulation of the term 'experience' he is amazed with the variety of uses this seemingly common and everyday word has had and still has.

It is thus evident that the word 'experience' does not lend itself easily to definition, but this does not release us from the responsibility of formulating what we mean when we say,"Experience." What then do we mean? Briefly we might say, an experience is a realization, or more definitely, any conscious event in our cognitive, conative, and affective life.

B. Structure of Experience

It must be noted here that this activity bears a subject-object relation or structure. In every experience there is a subject which experiences and an object which is experienced. Whitehead objects to this subject-object relation being identified with the bare relation of the knower to the known. He agrees with the notion that the fundamental structure pattern of experience is the subject-object relation, but not in the sense in which this is identified with the knower-known. He contends "that the notion of mere knowledge is a high abstraction, and that conscious discrimination is itself a variable factor only present in the more elaborate examples of occasions of experience."[1] Thus he feels, and I agree, that the

basis of experience is emotional. Stated more generally, the basic fact of an experience is the rise of an affective tone originating from things which are given.

There is therefore in every experience (1) the specific objects or object of the experience, which may be (a) particular facts either physical or psychical or (b) the relations between particular facts; (2) the definite relation in which these objects (or the object) of experience stand to the individual self (or subject) who is experiencing these relations; and (3) the attitude of the self which has the experience. It makes no essential difference in the situation whether the objects of the experience are physical objects or subjective states. In either case th fundamental structural pattern is the same --- experience is the realization of an object by a subject, or the realization of the relation of the object to the subject.

An object is thus seen to be anything performing the function of a datum which provokes some special activity of the occasion of the experience in question. As Whitehead has pointed out, "the process of experiencing is constituted by the reception of entities, whose being is antecedent to that process, into the complex fact which is that process itself. These antecedent entities, thus received as factors into the process of experiencing, are termed 'objects' for that experiential occasion. Thus primarily the term 'object' expresses the relation of the entity, thus denoted, to one or more occasions of experiencing. Two conditions must be fulfilled in order that an entity may function as an object in a process of experiencing: (1) the entity must be <u>antecedent</u>, and (2) the entity must be experienced in virtue of its antecedence; it must be <u>given</u>. Thus an object must be a thing received, and must be either a <u>mode</u> of reception or a thing <u>generated</u> in that occasion. Thus the process of experiencing is constituted by

the reception of objects into the unity of that complex occasion which is the process itself. The process creates itself, but it does not create the objects which it receives as factors in its own nature."[2]

Now it has been noted that an experience is not an entity but a process, a function, a realization. But it must be insisted that it is a process or function of a unique kind of an entity; it is a function of a self or subject. Whatever may be the specific character of the things, or relations, or things-in-relation, which constitute the objects of one's experiences, to such objects there must be added the subject, apart from which there would be no experience. As Leighton has so aptly put it, "Experience without the self is like the tragedy of Hamlet without the Prince."

"In order that there should be an experience, it is not sufficient that qualities and relations should be or be there; it is likewise necessary that they should be in a recognizable and identifiable synthesis. ... This synthesis is an actual factor of experience."[3] Any theory of experience which fails to take account of the fact that it is the subject or self which synthesizes one's experiences, which constitutes his 'personal' history, is inadequate. "The synthetic function of conscious selfhood remains the central fact in the world of experience. The individual is an "I", a subject of experience, which can never be reduced to the particular and changing contents of his experience. To say "his", or even "its", experience, implies an ego of some sort. Let one try to give a circumstantial account of a day's experiences, with all reference to the conscious self left out, and he will see what tiresome absurdities the denial of the ego lands him in."[4] The self is what it functions as, namely, as an individual focus of the relationships experienced. It also knows itself to function in such a capacity.

C. Process of Experiencing

Now in any experience, whatever it may be, something is felt. It is impossible for one to have an experience without sensation of emotion of some kind or other. But this feeling is not merely a feeling of pleasantness or of unpleasantness; yet one or the other, or both, may accompany it, for as Professor Buckham has said, "There are colors and tones in feeling as diverse and delicate as in music and painting, and some are both pleasurable and painful at the same time."[5] But this 'other' feeling is more of a realization that something has occured, an event has happened in my life. It is an 'I feel it.' It is of a different kind of quality from the feeling of pleasure or pain. Thus any experience that I have is emotional, or better, has an affective element in its nature. This is the basic factor in any experience.

In the statement "I feel it" we must emphasize along with the word 'feel' the word 'I', for in this felt experience it is I who feels or has felt it. Not John Jones feels it, but I feel it. The experience is personal; it is mine. It has come into my private life; it has taken up its abode in me. Some other being, person, or thing may be involved in the entire experience; some other person may have the same experience, but this in no wise affects the personalness of my experience. The experience is mine and remains mine as long as it has its abode in me. When it leaves me it ceases to be.

Another important side of this experience of mine is the 'knowing' side. This is not a knowing about, or an understanding, but a knowing. What I might find out about this experience, or already understand of it, or know of its relation to my other experiences, lies beyond the experience in question. It would involve more that just this experience.

I know this experience in that I recognize it. I recognize it an an experience. I recognize having met if before or I shall be able to recognize it when it comes again. When this experience is repeated I might say to it, "I know you; you are Beauty; we have met before. The last time we met you were dressed a little differently, but I still recognize you." This is like knowing a person at sight whom one has met and who dresses differently each time.

Now this experience does not happen to a person in the sense that the person is passive. The mind is receptive but this is not a passive receiving. "A mind is an individuated experient which lives in two kinds of attitudes --- (1) receptive and (2) active. In the receptive attitude the attentive consciousness is incited by external stimuli; that is, it is nonvoluntarily determined. In the active attitude attentive consciousness is determined by centrally originated feelings of which volition is a complex or highly elaborated form."[6] Thus receptivity is not passivity. In experience, as Tennant states, "there must be so much of subjective reaction as is required for receiving an impression. And that is not nil. Just as, in the analogue of 'passive' reception by wax of the impress of a seal, something must be credited to the wax in that it undergoes what, in the same circumstances, iron or water does not."[7]

It must be insisted here that this does not mean that our experiencies arise out of the mind alone, or that they are merely subjective states. It is true that the mind or subject colors or shapes out experiences and forms them into what they are, but they do not arise out of the mind alone. An experience is due to something which comes into contact with us. When this 'something' comes into contact with a personality the whole personality shapes this 'something' into an experience. The experience is not made by the subject for in all experience there is

an objective reference --- a reference to something other than the experiencing. The experience is dependent upon the mind, self, or personality, but it is not created by the mind, self, or personality alone. There must be both subject and object in every experience, both action and reaction.

From all this it may be seen that experience is not mere sensation. It is not mere reflection or reason. As Professor Buckham writes, "It is this wholeness and awareness that characterizes experience. Experience is not pure sensation, Neither is it pure reflection. It is thinking, feeling, willing, all in one. It is realization."[8] Thus we find that experience is not a series but a unity. It is a unity in that all three of these aspects are involved, and also a unity in that the thinking, feeling, and willing are simultaneous.

This unity is a "saddleback, not a knife-edge." Just as, as was pointed out above, the subject of self synthesizes one's experiences into one's 'personal' history, so also does the self unify each individual experience. Although thinking, feeling, and willing are simultaneous and present in each experience, they are not always present in equal amounts or degrees. One or the other of these aspects may predominate depending, upon the subject, object, and their relation in that particular experience.

D. The Self a Governing Factor

A self is not only a unifying, synthesizing activity, it is also a purposive, goal seeking entity, and, as such, it plays the part of a determining or governing factor in experience. In this role the self selects and emphasises certain factors that enter into its consciousness. It secects those portions of the objective manifold which are in harmony with its goal or purpose. The self is not able to experience only those parts of our en-

vironment which assist it in attaining its objective, but there is yet this selective factor which cannot be overlooked. As I sit here at my desk I am constantly being bombarded by many different stimuli from the outside and from within me. My consciousness consists simply of visual, auditory, tactual, and olfactory elements. It consists of the awareness of paper, pencil, desk, fragments of the room, a bit of the outside with its shrubs and flowers, the harsh sounds of motor horns, the noises of engines and wheels. Out of this conglomeration I am able to select those factors that aid me in my present pursuit.

Thus we arrive at the age-old problem of the 'freedom of the will'. We must hurriedly answer it here by saying, physical events are but its circumstances or occasions, and are often shaped by it. Just as the antecedent aspects of a particular volition are not entirely beyond our control and indeed, when most relevent, are shaped by the subject; so neither are they beyond our ascertaining --- at least theoretically. Now "there may be more, within us and without us, involved in volition, than we know; but we may claim general knowledge of the various antecedent stages by which the volitional act is determined. Those are perception, feeling, conation, concentration of attention, ideation; and in all of them we find subjective choice or activity. If by 'freedom of will' be meant 'subjective determination of volition', and if 'psychology without a subject' be but a science of the non-Actual, there is no question as to freedom. And there is no deterministic or necessitarian theory that does not presuppose sensationist psychology, with its fictitious abstractions. It must therefore be ascribed to inconsistency, that some philosophers, while professing to repudiate such psychology, and to recognise that, in knowing, there is activity, nevertheless refuse to the subject the power to choose; especially

as deliberation is an intellectual process."[9] Freedom of the will must therefore be admitted if we are to have a harmonious system in which the subject is active.

As was noted above, the conduct of the self is determined by ends, and these ends determined by the self. Tennant seems to feel that it is because of the teleological determination of conduct that we can understand it; and it is also because of this understanding of conduct that deterministic theory has been suggested. But when logic is forced to such an extreme it makes the activity of the self unintelligivle.

But this purposive striving, this freedom of volitional activity has ethical significance. It has ethical significance in that the must necessarily assume responsibility for his conduct. One must assune responsibility for his conduct because he possesses freedom in his activity. Thus it is that we can blame the self for the outcome of volition; or again that we can experience remorse. The judgments involved in moral blame and in remorse, imply the belief that one could, in the same circumstance, have done better. If one could not have done better, or at least differently; if his conduct were determined from without we could never have moral, or any other, responsibility.

The idea of purposive striving implies that the end is of value, of value at least for the goal-seeking self. Whether or not this is value of the highest sort is aside from the point here. The point here is that were the goal not considered as of worth to the self, did it not fulfill a desire or longing of the ego, it would not be an end, a <u>telos</u>. Thus the self as a governing factor in experience holds its ends to be of value, to possess worth, at least so in the selection of the elements of the experience.

E. Experience and Knowledge

Whitehead has stated that knowledge is conscious discrimination of objects experienced. This does not mean, I take it, that experience, as we have defined it, gives us knowledge about reality without any further activity on the part of the subject. It does not mean that reality reveals itself wholly, or in part, to us in any simple experience. But it does mean that in order for us to gain any knowledge of reality of reality we must begin by using what we find in our experiences.

Knowing is thus not an affair which is entirely external to the objects known. It is a process which takes place between a center of feeling, thought and action which is an immanent member of the real world and other items in the universe. "Knowing is a function of a conscious organism, in interplay with other dynamic entities, just as walking and eating are. An adequate account of what knowledge is cannot be given if one begins with the assumption that the individual, as knower, is shut up within his own psychical skin and can only get into touch with the real world by some sort of mortal leap of self-transcendence. Knowledge does not begin with an introspective examination of subjective states 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' ..... The mind is a function of the world. It is a live focus of reality, an organized center in which reality comes into active awareness of its own modes of behavior. Since the percipient organism is an individuated expression of the world's life, the qualities-in-relation that are cognized in perception are aspects of the real world."[10]

Thus whatever else may be contained in the knowing process it cannot be less than the object which is known and the subject which knows. But this, we have seen, is the structural pattern of experience. We may therefore conclude that the knowing process is basically experiential. Our

starting point for any knowledge of the real must be our experience.

F. Summary

For the purpose of this thesis there are certain points in this chapter which should be emphasized here. First of all we must not lose sight of the fact that any experience is a subject-object relation --- this is its structural pattern. In any given experience the object cannot be the subjective activity of that particular experience, nor produced by that process of experiencing. The object must be antecedent and given. This does not mean that one cannot experience himself or his own states. It simply means that the subject cannot be an object and a subject at the same time in the same experience.

Next we must remember that the subject is always active in experiencing. Certain data are given and received by the self but these data are not passively received. There is always subjective activity in receiving. Further, the subject or self is selective and focal and is thus able, in many occasions, to choose its data. In this directing of its own volitional activity it asserts the freedom it possesses, and, at the same time, assumes its moral responsibility.

The self is a goal-seeking entity and as such it asserts that there is such a thing as value, at least value for itself. The self is always pushing on toward an end, an end which it considers to be at least worth the striving. The self is thus a self-directing entity and not merely a machine or an organism externally ordered.

Lastly we must note that in the knowing process the subject and object play the important role. This does not mean that knowing is identical with experiencing, but it does mean that without the experience

of the object by the subject there would be no knowledge. Experience is therefore the basic factor in all knowledge.

CHAPTER II

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

A. Meaning of

A precise definition of the term 'religious experience' must not be looked for at the outset of our inquiry, for since our study in this chapter is concerned with the nature of religious experience we shall, in a way, be searching for such a definition. All that can be offered here is such a preliminary definition as will satisfactorily encompass that range of experience which we shall admit for examination and discussion.

In the previous chapter was outlined the nature of experience in general. Now just what part of our entire experience do we single out and term 'religious experience'? Briefly we might say that it is that part of our experience, or those experiences, which lies beyond the range of our common everyday life. It is the realization of a greater and deeper reality --- the realization of a realm that lies beyond common experience and yet not apart from it. Religious experience is thus of a deeper and higher spiritual reality. As Brightman has said, it is "any experience in which attitudes, feelings, or beliefs, with reference to an object valued as worthy of worship, a God or gods, play a determining part."[1]

It is at once apparent that we are here dealing with a realm beyond our material world, beyond the realm of sense experience. Since the existence of this realm is doubted by many we must endeavor to show upon what we base our conviction.

Many of our foremost scientists today are finding that it is impossible to explain all things in terms of 'particles in motion'. As

Jeans says, "Mechanism has shot its bolt." These scientists, who for years have been examining into the nature of things, are now unable to explain their findings without admitting a realm over and above the physical. This fact is in itself rather conclusive evidence of a 'more than physical realm', but it is in the realm of philosophy that we are able to find better explanations of the nature of reality. Professor Whitehead, in his book Adventures of Ideas, writes, "The universe is dual because, in the fullest sense, it is both transient and eternal. The universe is dual because each final actuality requires abstract character. The universe is dual because each occasion unites its formal immediacy with objective otherness. The universe is many because it is wholly and completely to be analysed into many final actualities --- or in Cartesian language, into many res verae. The universe is one, because of the universal immanence. There is thus a dualism in this contrast between the unity and multiplicity. Throughout the universe there reigns the union of opposites which is the ground of dualism."[2]

Beyond this idea of dualism we must insist upon a realm supernatural or else limit our conception of man and personality. Unless there is a realm beyond our material world, beyond our sensory consciousness, then man is a product of nature, a mere mass of 'inherited tendency.' But we hold man to be a moral agent, to be morally responsible. We hold that it is the essence of what we call person "to stand in a relation with beings having an autonomy, in whom he recognizes rights, toward whom he acknowledges duties."[3] And, further, unless we hold to this realm beyond nature we are forced to give up all notions of God, freedom, and immortality. As Howison has so well stated, "Unless there is a real man underived from Nature, unless there is a spiritual or rational man independent of the natural man

and legislatively sovereign over intire Nature, then the Eternal is not a person, there is no God, and our faith is vain."[4] Upon this we base our conviction of a realm beyond the natural, beyond the material.

B. Religious Experienced Distinguished

We have defined religious experience as the realization of a greater and deeper reality or as the awareness of a realm beyond common experience --- the apprehension of the numinous. But, does this experience contain all the elements found in common experience? Is it, too, an affective, cognitive, conative realization? Is it a subject-object relationship?

Religious experience, like common experience, has an affective basis, it is emotional. As Hocking has said, "It is of course, no new discovery that religion is an affair of the heart rather than the head."[5] Religious experience is a feeling --- a felling of the inner self, not of the senses. Schleiermacher has called this a "feeling of Dependence." This element is existent even in primitive religions. Primitive man uses the term 'Mana' to express the awe and fear he feels toward It. In the more advanced religions, and especially Christianity, the word 'Love' is used to express the emotion or feeling found in deep religious experiences. But beside this feeling of Love there is also the feeling that is present in our everyday experiences --- it too is a 'something felt'.

It is impossible to separate emotion and cognition, for the two do not exist apart from one another. Now in religion we must recognize a cognitive factor. But just what kind of knowledge is 'religious knowledge'? It is direct knowledge or intuitive knowledge. It is immediate knowledge. Religious knowledge is knowledge of acquaintance

not discursive knowledge. "It is, of course, in the nature of the case," writes Kenneth Edward, in his volume Religious Experience, "impossible to describe knowledge of acquaintance. The recurring difficulty of describing an 'experience' of our own, resides in the fact that we have to translate a knowledge of acquaintance into a knowledge of description, and the latter always leaves out all that makes up the real nature of the former. Acquaintance is incommunicable in the nature of the case. The knowledge of acquaintance is as directly held in consciousness as is a sense presentation, which is a special case of it. This is the kind of knowledge we are talking about when we talk about experience. It is what we usually mean by knowledge when we talk about knowledge in a general way. It is the kind of knowledge which makes up our experience of the world, upon the basis of which all our sciences and philosophies, with their discursive knowledge, are built up. It is the texture of the body of our experience on its cognitive side. It matters not how the knowledge may first have been mediated to us, it is woven into our experience as it is thus taken into the clasp of direct apprehension."[6] We might add here that this knowledge, or recognition, is the same as our knowledge of other persons. It is in this manner that we know our friends --- by personal acquaintance. Religious knowledge might thus be called 'personal knowledge'.

Just as we found a conative element in common experience so we find such an element in religious experience. Religion is not only a feeling and a knowing, it is an attitude. Now attitudes are acts for acts are not only physical but also mental. In religion we consider faith to be the highest form of conation or volition. "There is," writes Tennant, "need for the word 'faith' in addition to the word 'belief', though they are often used as synonyms. 'Belief' serves to emphasise the cognitive,

and 'faith' to lay stress on the conative, side of experience involving venture. Belief is more or less constrained by fact or Actuality that already is or will be, independently of any striving of ours, and which convinces us. Faith, on the other hand, reaches beyond the Actual or the given to the ideally possible, which in the first instance it creates, as the mathematicism posits his entities, and then by practical activity may realise or bring into Actuality. Every machine of human invention has thus come to be. Again, faith may similarly lead to knowledge of Actuality which it in no sense creates, but which would have continued, in absence of the faith-venture, to be unknown: as in the discovery of America by Columbus."[7] This is not the same as saying that faith in all things will lead to their being realized as actualities. Faith in experiment has not produced a machine capable of perpetual motion. "Faith is venture dictated by human interest: it is not mere prudence or probability, for these cannot be, till faith has substantiated somewhat of the hoped for; it is not confined to the realms of moral value and religious ideas, but infects all existential and theoretical knowledge. The Objective situation, alone, determines with compulsion neither the probabilities of science nor the creed of religion; at most it suggests. In either case, it is a particular subjective attitude toward Objective situations, that is determinative and originative."[8]

We have now seen that religious experience is the realization of an object by a subject, and also that it is an affective, cognitive, conative realization. But just where is this experience to be distinguished from those we call 'common'? It is to be distinguished by the nature of its object, or Object, and in the manner of our awareness of this Object.

C. The Object of Religious Experience

Throughout the history of thought men have tried to find a word or principle to encompass this Object, this Reality, which proves to be far beyond our meager understanding. Plato thought of It as "The Good"; Aristotle called It "The Unmoved Mover"; Jesus spoke of It as "Father". For ages men have tried to fromulate what they experience in moments they call "religious". Philosophers past and present tell us that this Object, this Reality experienced, is God. But to call It God does not satisfy us unless we know what is meant. What then do we mean when we say "God"? What is the nature of the Object of religious experience? Have we an idea to embody this Object of these experiences?

Upon examination this Object, this deeper and higher Reality is found to be not merely a 'Something' but a very definite 'Something'. Pushing the investigation further this definite 'Something' is found to be, not a 'Something', but, a 'Someone' --- the experience is often described as "a felt presence". The Object is thus found to be personal --- yes, even more than personal for we do not mean a person but PERSON --- free from all human limitations. This Personality contains within Itself at least all that is within our finite personalities, and these raised to an infinite height. As Tennant writes, "Within the human sphere personality includes the self-consciousness which distinguishes the adult man from the infant and from non-rational animals, together with all else such as the moral status, the persuit of ends, the synthesis of character, that may be superimposed on subjecthood when individual experience has attained to the common standpoint through social intercourse. And inasmuch as the world-ground, as reached by inquiry into the natures of the world and man, is a satisfactory explanation-principle solely in virtue

of its possession of intelligence and ethical purposiveness, it must needs be conceived in terms of personality. The divine nature may include more than the potentialities of man indefinitely perfected, even capacities as far removed from our ken as human science is beyond the range of a worm's cognition; but, whatever else it may or may not include, it is at least characterised by intelligence, valuation, and volition."[9]

In saying that God is personal we thus mean that He is a conscious Being, a unitary and unified Spirit, who knows and feels and wills, with unfailing memory, reason, and purpose, and who stands in moral relationship with other personal beings. In contrast to man, He is bound to no particular biological organism; He uses the entire universe as an instrument of expression. His experience is far greater than ours and His knowledge includes all we have known and more. He is above all creative and through this power He can bring into being what did not previously exist.

One might ask at this point, What is the value of conceiving God as personal? It must be stated in reply that if our God is not a personal God the universe would have no purpose or reason, man would be a machine, prayer would be merely meditation or contemplation, morality and religion could not be, and our future indeed hopeless. But if God is personal, "prayer is communion and response, religion is conscious cooperation between human persons and the Divine Person, conscious reason and purpose control the universe, man need never despair."[10] Consequently, our whole moral, religious, and social realms --- not to mention our ordered universe, --- depend upon our conception of God. If God is personal man's future is bright, if impersonal, hopeless.

It must further be noted that the Object of our religious experiences, our Personal God, is both transcendent and immanent. He is both far beyond and away from us, but at the same time here and with us. God stands outside our world as one directing it on to higher goals, but He is at the same time in it directing it on to gain these ends. He is transcendent as an artist transcends his painting; He is immanent as the artist is immanent in his painting. In our lives we find God to be both transcendent and immanent. God is found outside ourselves and in the world around us, but He is also found within. Kagawa aptly put it when he said, "I shall dig down within myself until I find God."

D. Religious Experience as Mystical

The Object of our religious experiences is seen to differ from the objects of our sense perceptions. This Object does not seem to have the same independent and detached character that other objects have. It does not force itself upon our attention in the same way that sticks and stones do. We do not experience It merely by going to a certain place at a certain time. We do not know God in the same impersonal manner that we know things of the senses, and our knowledge of Him is not communicable and verifiable in the same objective way that scientific knowledge is supposed to be. Consequently God is not mediated to us through sense perception, but is experienced, if experienced at all, directly. This we call mystical experience.

Now mysticism has been variously defined by writers upon the subject, but most of them agree that in any experience that might be termed mystical there is the immediate consciousness of the presence of 'something'. As Dean Inge has written, it is "the attempt to realize, in thought and

feeling, the immanence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal."[11] Thus in religious mysticism this 'something' is held to be God. The mystic believes that he has experienced God because these experiences have come from beyond the margin of his individual me; because there is something in the content of his experience which transcends anything that normally belongs to him in his finiteness; and because these experiences possess an impelling, coercive power, a higher unification of life than he ordinarily knows.[12]

In many cases this experience is one that comes to a person and is not definitely sought, although it frequently comes when the subject is consciously engaged in worship. Prayer likewise may or may not be mystical, for only in the sense of being in the presence of, and in communication with God is prayer mystical. But this does not mean that people have not consciously tried to attain mystical insight. There are those who have and do definitely seek such experiences of God at definite times and places. For them mysticism is usually "a process of selective concentration and concomitant abstraction of attention. It is not pursuit of introspection, but rather of 'introversion': dismissal of distracting sensible and motor perception, of imagery and discursive thought. The outer world and the empirical ego being hushed, a stillness is secured in which God may be 'heard'. The soul, to use another figure, is put to sleep; the natural eye of the soul is closed; waking thought-process is in abeyance. Then only, the mystical experience par excellence emerges."[13] The self or subject must, of course, be there to function and enjoy the experience. It must also be there to remember it afterward, but for other purposes the self must be reduced to as little as possible.[14]

Mysticism, although accepted by most religious thinkers, has

definite limits. The mystics have claimed for themselves an immediate awareness of God, but they also admit that while this experience has given them a greater assurance of the reality of God, it has not increased their knowledge as to what He is. Insofar as the mystic's experience has a definite content, it has been derived from his previous knowledge or earlier training. As Tennant writes, "That God raises the rapt mystic's soul to 'union' with Himself; that certitude as to this , is such that God alone can give, and such like theological tenets, are 'immediate' truths only to Christians or theists."[15] Mysticism may give us support in our conviction that God exists, but it cannot give us knowledge as to His nature. We must therefore take the findings of the mystics and hold then up to the penetrating light of reason. Only in this way will we be able to understand God and His universe in its entirety.

We may safely say that religious experiences of God are mystical experiences. Not that one must become a mystic, in the extreme sense of the term, in order to know God, but that the experiencing of God is mystical --- and we are all mystical enough to have such experiences.

E. Religion a Value-Experience

It is a well known fact that men find value in their religious experiences. But are these values true values? Is religion a value-experience, an experience of the worth of something, or does man merely attribute value to his religion without any basis for so doing? Let us investigate.

'Value' always has a primary reference to the satisfaction of human desires and the feeling of joy and pleasure that accompanies such

satisfaction. That is held to have value which is capable of satisfying some desire of our nature and is consequently felt by us to be 'good'. It thus appears that there are many values, some higher and some lower, but a true value is what is liked, desired, or approved in the light of our whole experience, our highest ideals, our complete personality. It at once appears that value is not a purely objective property of the thing itself. The value always denotes a certain relation of an object to a subject. It refers to a mind or subject that is capable of appreciating or enjoying the object.

Obviously there are different kinds of values and each kind is of importance to our daily life, but they do not all belong to our religious life as such. D. Miall Edwards classifies the more important values as follows:[16] (1) Utilitarian or Economic; (2) Hedonistic or Psychological; (3) Ethical; (4) Intellectual; (5) Aesthetic; and (6) the Holy. These are the more important values of our daily life. But what values enter into religious experience? What values do we consider to be definitely religious?

Rudolf Otto has isolated what he considers to be a unique element in religious experience. He maintains that religion has this value as its own, distinct from the other values which belong to human activities. This value he calls Holiness or the Sacred. "'Holiness' --- 'the holy' --- is a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion. It is, indeed, applied by transference to another sphere --- that of Ethics --- but it is not derived from this."[17] To keep 'holiness' isolated from the moral element, Otto invents the term 'numinous', and he speaks of a "unique numinous category of value", "a category of valuation which has no place in the everyday natural world

of ordinary experience."[18] This 'numinous' designates the pure and unmodified experience of the divine --- Otto calls it a mysterium tremendum et fascinum, a feeling of awe or fear toward 'the Wholly Other'. This 'Wholly Other' evokes in man a 'creature-feeling' or emotion of self-abasement. It also makes the highest claim on man as being worthy of praise, worthy of worship.

Otto's recognition of the Holy is important to an adequate understanding of religion, but we cannot agree with his isolating the Holy from morality except through transference. Religion without morality is incomplete, for morality gives religion a fielf of action. These two make up the "warp and woof" of living. Holiness may be primarily a religious value but it does not exclude ethical values from religion. Religion must include all values that have to do with personal relationships; religion is not a departmental affair.

Religious experience may unquestionably be considered to be a value-experience. It is the experience or realization of a Being worthy of worship. To our religious consciousness God is apprehended as the Being who satisfies the deepest desires of our human hearts --- our hearts at their deepest and best. As Edward's writes, "He is the supreme value demanded by the wants of the soul, to be possessed, possessed by, utilised, enjoyed, feared, loved, adored, worshipped, worthshipped."[19]

F. Conclusion

From our investigation we have found that our religious experience reveals to us a Personal God --- a Personal God who is a cosmic power and who stands in moral relationship to other personal beings. In our finding of a Personal God we have made religion a vital force in our

lives. Prayer now is seen to be conscious communion and response, and religion becomes conscious cooperation between human persons and the Supreme Person. The universe is thus found to be guided by conscious reason and purpose, and the future of man is indeed secure.

It now becomes apparent that if God is a Personal God there must be a personal realm for not even God could be Personal without the association of other persons. What we mean by being personal is to stand in relation to other beings in whom we recognize rights and toward whom we acknowledge duties. Our religious experience thus reveals to us not only a Personal God but also a personal realm, a realm of moral beings. This personal realm is a realm in which the members realize one another and find each other to be moral beings.

CHAPTER III

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND PERSONALITY

A. Statement of the Thesis

In the opening pages of this thesis it was stated that a vital and adequate religious experience, whether recognized as such or not, is a true developing factor of personality. It is thus our contention that an adequate religious experience aids one in passing from the non-personal to the personal realm. It now becomes our purpose to show how this passing or awakening --- it is truly more of an awakening than a passing --- takes place.

We have noted that a baby is not born into the personal realm. The baby at birth is merely a potential person --- a potential person as the acorn is a potential oak. This potentiality may become an actuality only by an awakening, a rebirth. It may be either sudden, as in a great moral crisis or deep religious conviction, or it may be a slow developmental process. In any case it is an awakening or rebirth. But how does an adequate religious experience aid the self in passing from the realm of mere selfhood into the realm of personality? In what way does a religious experience awaken the moral nature of the potential person? What is the relation of the religious nature to the moral nature of man?

B. Development of Personality

In order for any being to attain personality, take his place in the moral realm with other moral beings, he must, first of all, realize himself; he must find himself for himself. If man cannot realize himself how can he realize others? It is only by man's becoming aware

of himself that he is able to become aware of others. But this self-realization seems to involve a kind of contradiction of terms, for, as George Herbert Palmer writes, "How can I build if at present there is no I? Why should I build if at present there is an I?"[1] How can a self realize itself? This appears to be an absurdity yet it is on this absurdity that personal life is based. The self must be aware of itself, be conscious of itself, must discover itself before any development can take place. There is no personality where there is no self-consciousness, and this is the essential element out of which all the others spring. As Tennant writes, "To be a person, is to know that one is a person; and an experient attains to the rank of personal being when he can regard himself, not only as possessing more of less a permanent identity, such as belongs to the physicist's mass-particles that have no 'insides', but also as having tastes, aims, character and so forth, in virtue of which he is unique. He is one who thinks, will, loves, plays many parts, owns his body and mental qualities. Once full self-consciousness, mediated by intercourse, has been attained, higher refinements of the personal status become possible."[2]

Self-realization involves another absurdity besides that of the self realizing itself. The self most fully realizes itself only when it is conscious of other selves. Unless one respects other persons he cannot respect himself, and if he cannot respect himself he certainly knows nothing of respecting others. Jesus recognized this when he said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." It is also in this manner that the child becomes aware of himself. The infant finding himself among other persons finally realizes himself, not merely as an object but as a subject, or better, as a subject-object. Thus, although we must become aware

of ourselves in order to develop a personality, we must be conscious of other persons in order to be able to fully realize our own personal nature.

This coming to one's self does not always involve a conscious coming to God. The moral relation to another human being may be the only relation that is recognized. But this is not the same as saying that there is no relation to the Supreme Person. Abou Ben Adhem told the angel to write his name "as one who loves his fellow-men," but when the angel appeared again,

> "And showed the names whom love of God had blest;
> And lo! Ben Adhem's name led all the rest."

This point was also well illustrated by Jesus when he said, "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethern, even these least, ye did it unto me."[3]

We thus see that the awakening of the self, the True Self, is not a purely solitary, self-originated process. But neither is it a simple social act in which man merely becomes aware of his fellow beings. Our self-realization in volves a religious experience even though that experience is beclouded by other elements. The very realization of our meager selves cannot be accomplished without this divine movement. We may not be fully conscious of this Presence, but we cannot fully account for our self-awareness without it. If we carefully examine our consciousness in the process we shall surely find It. As Professor Buckham, in his volume Personality and the Christian Ideal, states, "Consciousness testifies to the presence and aid of a Spirit other than our own in the awakening of the higher self. In every significant moral decision, though one be a thousand miles from any human person, he is deeply aware that he is acting in the presence of a Moral Person, not indifferent to his decisions,

but who approves and furthers him in every way consonant with his own autonomy. Call this Other what we may, it is present with us in our moral and spiritual activity and present as an aid."[4]

One might object here by saying that we are departing from religious experience as we have defined it. But can we not be aware of the presence, the aid of something without our being able to explain what it is that is present or is aiding us? Can we not experience something without knowing what it is that we experience? Surely men have and do make use of the laws of nature without being able to tell what the laws are or explain how they function. Thus it is with many of our religious experiences. "The difficulty about religious experience," writes L. P. Jacks, "is not to get it, but to recognize it when it comes. It is always coming our way."[5] In answer to our objector we must therefore say that it is the presence and the awareness, the feeling, of the presence that is the important thing, not how we define it.

Religious experience is thus found to be vital to our development of personality. We have seen that in order for any being to develop a personality he must first of all realize himself. But it is impossible for him to realize himself, his higher self, without the association of others like himself. Thus complete self-realization involves moral activity. But, as we have seen, there is no real moral decision without a divine movement, "a felt presence", within the individual. In any moral act one not only feels that he has done right but he also feels that there is One who knows that he has done right.

C. Personality an Organization

As we noted above, "Once full self-consciousness, mediated by

intercourse, has been attained, higher refinements of the personal status become possible." Indefinite growth toward an ever enlarging ideal now can take place. "An individual experient who has acquired self-consciousness," writes Tennant, "is as truly a person as he ever will be, though his personality may yet become enriched in content."[6] True as this may be the person amy yet say, "I have not as yet become my True Self, my true personality." Personality is thus a matter of degree, a matter of acvancement and attainment; and there may be infinite stages between human and divine.

Personality is understood to include the capacities which actually or potentially belong to all men: social and ethical relations, thought and conscience, memory, will, etc. It is the interweaving of these into a system, an organization, that distinguishes the person from the animal and the infant. The true person is thus not an aggregate or collection but an organization. But there can be no organization without a purpose, so until the self has gained a goal or aim all his forces work contrary to one another, there is no peace or harmony within; he is what has been called "a disjunct self". Consequently a person is an organization with a purpose or goal.

D. Personality and Purpose

The unity of the self lies mainly in its uniquely personal will. This will, or volitional part of the person's make-up, is different from intention. It is different in that it not only anticipates an end but consciously strives to effect the transition from the ideal to the actual. It is here that the will is also differentiated from desire. Desire does not strive to attain the end.

An individual self is a concrete existent whose conduct, complex though it may be, is controlled by an internal and self-possessed purpose. However socialized his thought, interests, and aims may become, they are yet his. Social ideals and principles have no existence or meaning except as issuing from and referring back to the felt unity of the individual self. The more that human persons come to think, feel, and act together for social and universal ends the more distinctly individual they become. The individual may be completely socialized yet he will ever remain a free, purposive being. His purpose may coincide with the purpose of society as a whole yet it will forever remain his purpose.

But, as we have already noted,[7] this determining of conduct by ends has definite moral significance. It has moral significance "in that the idea of an end precedes moral action; in that the end adopted can be credited to the acquired character of the whole personality; and in that the end can be approved or disapproved by the subject."[8] It is thus that we can hold the individual responsible for his actions, can blame him for the outcome of his volitions. He is free to choose his goals, he can approve or disapprove of his own actions. Unless one chooses or approves of ends which are in harmony with the welfare of his fellow beings he is in danger not only of being socially immoral but of hindering the development of his own personality. His purposes are his and will always remain his but these goals must not be choosen merely in the light of his selfish desires if his personality is to be truly enlarged. Where there is no recognition of others outside the individual person there is no development of the person. In order to be a person at all one must recognize other persons, and in order for the person to develop to a higher level in the personal realm he must act in accordance with this recognition. Thus in

choosing a goal in life one must recognize an end higher than his own individual self; he must recognize an end or goal of humanity.

It is here that Christianity offers mankind the largest aid in the development of human personality. Christianity holds before all men an ideal for which to strive --- the Kingdom of God. This Kingdom of God is a goal which cannot be attained by any one person striving alone. It cannot be attained by any group alone. The Kingdom of God will never be realized until all men working together seek the highest for all; highest not only economically but also morally and spiritually. This can only be accomplished when all men recognize their moral relationship to their fellow men and to God.

E. Personality and Values.

Joseph Alexander Leighton, in his volume Man and the Cosmos, says that "the most persistent and central characteristic of the self is the fact that it evaluates, appreciates, and hence exercises selective preference among its possible ends and possessions."[9] The basis of valuation is feeling or interest. An idea or a percept can evoke feeling, which in turn may excite conation. A picture may please the self, and in virtue of the feeling caused, become an object appreciated, or of aesthetic value. But this is individual value and, although it perhaps makes the individual person's life richer for itself, it does not make for the development of personality as do social and moral values.

In individual value the person may call a thing 'good' because it is desired and the attaining of it gives him pleasure or serves some prevate end. But this 'good' may not be the same for all men, indeed, his very attaining or having it may prove to the detriment of others.

(In a larger sense it would also be a detriment to him.) A 'social good' would therefore be one that is good for all, or perhaps, as Tennant has stated, "good-in-itself'.

It is a generally accepted fact that no two individual persons are alike, but, true as this statement may be, no two individual persons are altogether different. "None are isolated; in virtue of certain extra-regarding interests and desires, none are originally pure egoists; none unfamiliar with social restraint. Hence the possibility of some community of desire, and of co-operation towards a common end, is ensured."[10] Through intercourse with other persons the individual comes to share in the common knowledge of a common world, a world which includes other selves. Here in this realm he becomes acquainted not only with new values but also with a new standard by which he values things, by which he values himself, his desires and conduct, and all other phases of life. He now not only sees that others contribute to his welfare but that he must also contribute to the welfare of others. It is here that he recognizes the 'ought'.

With the recognition of this 'ought' comes a new system of personal values. The individual can no longer seek values of simple personal gain. The 'ought' takes precedence over desire and even helps to change the desires of the person. This does not mean that a person cannot and will not seek those things which enrich his own private life. The 'ought' does not narrow individual personal life, it broadens and deepens it, it even adds new individual values. The things that now become of value which heretofore were unknown are mainly in the realm of personal and social gains. The individual now sees value in the ends and goals of society.

But social progress and social 'goods' are meaningless and unreal, except in so far as they are related to persons. "The respect paid

to personality, and the scope allowed for its free development, are the truest measures of the moral quality of a culture, the true standards of human progress. The reflective life of self-determining persons is the only absolutely worthful reality we know."[11] Kant therefore was right when he said, "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."[12] His categorical imperative, "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law,"[13] is thus the true imperative.

As we have already noted, value, desire and satisfaction cannot be separated from the idea of purpose. The moral nature of man is constantly striving toward a state of perfection. This attitude involves the consciousness of imperfection and the idea of the moral goal. "The whole seriousness and significance of the moral life in man rests on the faith latent in it, not only that the goal can be attained, not only that the breach between the 'is' and the 'ought-to-be' can be healed; but that it is already healed, that the good is the supreme reality, that the 'ought-to-be' now and eternally 'is'."[14] We are thus brought firmly back to man's essential religious nature with its values and goals.

F. God and Personality

Religion in its highest forms stresses the idea of communion with Deity. This Deity is conceived of in many ways, but the highest and most satisfactory idea seems to be that of a personal God, not a God who is a person but a personal God. A God who stands in close communion with other persons.

Conceiving of God as being personal helps us understand the re-

lationship which man bears to God, and consequently to all other personal beings. "Best of all," writes Professor Buckham, in his enlightening book The Humanity of God, "the concept personality clarifies and conserves the kinship of God and man, while at the same time defining and differentiating them. Human beings are individual selves. Individuality is their hallmark, their badge, their priesthood. They have self-consciousness, self-identity, unity, memory, and, greatest of all, moral potentiality, the capacity to become true persons, i.e., possessors of moral worth and freedom. Personality for human beings is a development, to be won by moral exertion and spiritual culture. They are actuated by a sense of obligation and drawn upward by an ideal and are, therefore, free. This ideal greatens as the individual develops, but in the end gets its meaning from the reality of the Perfect Himself."[15]

As personal, God is not, like human persons, an individual, God is not a person but at the same time there is no other God or gods. If God is, He must be the Only God. God is thus a unitary and unified Spirit, a conscious Being who knows, feels, and wills, with unfailing memory, reason, and purposes. He is bound to no limiting biological organism but is free to use the entire universe as an instrament of expression. He is, above all, creative and thus can bring into being what previously did not exist.

As personal and as creator God is the source of all personality. This does not mean that God created me at birth or at conception. These are definite happenings in space and time, or space-time --- personality is not a space-time concept. You cannot fix the creation of a person at any definite place nor in any instant in time. As Professor Buckham writes, "If finite personality be a creation at all, then, it must be an eternal creation. By this is not meant merely pre-temporal creation. Nothing is

gained by simply pushing the creation of the soul backward to a time before it enters this life. Not such is the meaning of eternal. Eternal means the transcendence of time; not the unlimited extension of time."[16] Thus when we say that personality is a creation of God we do not mean that God assembled an organism, whether spiritual or physical, at any moment in time, but that no personality ever came into being, or ever can come into being, without a divine movement.

If God is the source of all personality He must be related to the personalities he has created. The Christian religion, more than any other religion, stresses this point. Here God is conceived of as the Father of all men --- the Fatherhood of God and the Sonship of man. Jesus was the first person to note this symbolism in our relationship with God. Professor Buckham states that "it was in this that Jesus was creatively original. Upon his lips Abba menat more than any name for God ever meant before. So purely and ardently did it issue from the depths of his own experience as to communicate itself to his disciples and through them to others in such vivid reality as to make a new and transforming epoch in the life of the human spirit."[17] Jesus taught us that God as our Heavenly Father cares for His 'earthly children' --- "Even the very hairs of your head are all numbered." He not only cares for us but is "an ever present help in the time of need."

God is thus the creator of all finite personalities, and, as creator, all may be confident that He does not feel that His responsibility is ended by this creation; He does not neglect His creations. He is a God who stands in intimate relationship with human personalities. Now since the only personal relationships that we have any knowledge of are moral relationships we must conclude that God stands in moral relationship with

us as personal beings. But if we are morally obligated to God we must be able to attain some notion of His desires and will. We do claim to have some knowledge of the will of God. This knowledge, we contend, is to be gained, by all who earnestly seek it, through religious experience.

G. Religious Experience and the Development of Personality

If God stands in moral relationship with human persons we, as such, must recognize and fulfil our moral obligations to Him. In any adequate religious experience this obligation is recognized. It is impossible to become conscious of the presence of God without feeling that we are personally related to God. As Leighton writes, "In religious experience, in faith and communion with God, the individual feels himself to be in contact with, and in very possession of, this ultimate spiritual reality for which the good is no longer a far-off divine event but a present and ever-abiding reality. Nevertheless, while the religious attitude transcends and completes the moral attitude it does not do so by abolishing the latter; rather the religious attitude absorbs into itself the moral attitude."[18] This being the case, religious experience consequently must be an important factor in the development of any human personality.

We pointed out above that in order for there to be any development of personality the self must become conscious of himself, must realize himself. Nowhere do we find any greater aid to self-realization than in a deep religious experience, and the more intense the awareness of God the more intense the awareness of the self. In religious experience we become aware of our inadequacy and of our dependence upon God. We cannot experience God, or anything else, without at the same time realizing that we are experiencing. Extreme forms of mysticism fail to recognize

this element in their experiences of God and this is the exact point at which they become inadequate, inadequate to the higher development of society and thus to themselves.

Beyond self-realization, religious experience, and especially Christian experience, reveals not only the Sonship of man but the Brotherhood of man. "The consciousness of Presence, sensitizes moral obligation. The sense of sin and penitence which follows a wrong done to others is bound up with the conviction that the act is a wrong also to One in whom the Moral Law has its source and Sanction. The full meaning of moral offense is not, cannot be, realized until one comes to realize with the psalmist, 'Against Thee have I sinned.' Nor will the full force of social injustice be felt, as the prophets of Israel felt it, until it is seen not only as against humanity but as against the Guardian of the moral order."[19] Consciousness of a personal God thus has a twofold effect. It not only brings him who has this consciousness into harmony with the Source of all personality, but it also brings him to realize that there are others like himself to whom he is related, related not only physically but morally and spiritually.

In recognizing this moral relationship to our fellowmen we are well on the way to the development of a fuller and richer personality. We now become interested and active for goals over and above our private wishes. We now become interested in the welfare of those about us. We desire to bring about, so far as man can bring it about, a society in which all men shall have ample opportunity to develop and enrich their personalities to the greatest possible extent. In short, we become interested in the Kingdom of God. We begin to strive for the Kingdom of God, not as a private attainment to be enjoyed in some future existence,

but as the Kingdom of God here on earth. This is not to discredit, what might be called, the Kingdom of Heaven, but merely to point out that the Kingdom of God is to be as real for this world as for any other world or realm.

The social results which may come from adequate religious experiences must not be allowed to dim the values achieved by the individuals. Religious experience is a value-experience and as such has positive worth for the individual having the experience. As we noted above religion includes all values that have to do with personal relationships, it includes all moral values. But these are not the only values an individual seeks. Does religious experience in any way affect these values?

Religion, we noted, greatly unifies the life of the individual by giving him ideals and goals of the highest order. This unification of life is not merely for the purpose of society but also for the individual himself. Things now are looked at from a larger background and thus new values are found and old ones enriched. The old individuals values of life take on deeper significance when they are looked at from this higher level. They take on greater significance merely because they are in harmony with one's deeper purpose. Happiness is now deepened, deepened mainly because it is not at the expense of other personalities. Economic values may even be included here, for man no longer strives for goods at the expense of personality, whether his own or that of another. Examples of this can be found every day and in all walks of life. Religious experience not only introduces one into the realm of moral and religious values but it also greatens the values of the non-moral realms. Religious experience thus not only makes the individual of infinite worth, both for himself and others, but it helps man to heighten all values of life.

We now see that a religious experience is a true, if not the true, developing factor in personality. But it is also more than just a developing factor, it is a true "enricher" of the developing and developed --- developed not to its highest but none the less developed --- personality. Religious experience enriches life not only by increasing and enlarging those human values for which we all strive, but it enriches life in that it harmonizes the human will with the divine will. It is only in this way that the true person can say and mean, "Not my will, but thine, be done."

H. Summary

We now see that we may call a personality developed --- so far as it is developed --- only when the self has attained to the rank of a moral being, only when he acknowledges other beings like himself, other beings in whom he recognizes rights and toward whom he acknowledges duties. He is a person only when he fully realizes that one man is no man. He is a person only when he fully realizes himself. But once thus developed the individual takes his place in society and strives to enrich not only his own life but also the lives of his associates.

As soon as this development starts taking place the person begins to organize his forces and strives for newer and greater heights. Life now has a real purpose, it has a new meaning. His striving ceases to be for selfish ends and he now sees value in things that formerly were a hindrance to him. He now finds that great values lie in the moral realm, and he seeks to enrich his own life by helping other persons enrich theirs. He strives to build the "Great Community."

But this development can take place only when one fully realizes

that the universe is not out of harmony with his higher purposes. Until he realizes that there is a God who is personally related to him and who is interested in his life man will never develop to any great extent. As long as man feels that he is merely the product of a blind evolutionary force which cares not for personal his development will not be very rapid and his goals not very high. But as soon as he realizes that evolution is not without a goal which is drawing it forward he knows that he can take his place as a helper in the great scheme of things.

Religious experience, we have noted, gives us a basis for constructing a world in which man is able to attain the highest possible development. Through our relationship with God we become related to the great divine order of the universe and thus find ourselves as co-workers with God in bringing about a society of persons which shall be worthy of being called "The Kingdom of God."

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

A. Application

In the previous chapters of this thesis we have been considering the nature of religious experience and its relation to the development of human personality. Our whole study thus far has been in the realm of intellectual specualtion and not in the realm of practical application. We have considered the relation of individual personalities to society and the effects they have upon one another. We have noted that human personality is dependent upon a society of persons, and that apart from individual personalities there is no society. We have now arrived at a conclusion as to the nature of human personality and its development. It is that in order for any individual experient to enter into the personal realm he must recognize others and acknowledge his obligations to them. We have also concluded that in order for anyone to fully realize thus end he must undergo a real religious experience whether he recognizes it as a religious experience or not.

In the introduction to this thesis a cursory analysis of present day society was made. There it was pointed out that our material advancement has gone forward at the expense of human personalities. Our material success has not furthered the development of human personality that one might have expected. Man has developed machines to aid him in him in achieving material growth, but now these machines are tending to become the master of man in place of his being the master of the machines. The scientists and philosophers have also adjusted their theories to accord with this type of civilization. We contend that all this need not be.

We believe that our society and civilization can be saved from itself. We say that it is not the nature of man to be thus. Man, we hold, is os a nature that can have such material prosperity and yet not lose his "personal touch". Let us see if our study can help us solve the present difficulty.

B. Personal Religion

In turning to experience as the basis for any study connected with man we note that there is no experience that is without social causes and social effects. Likewise there is no social experience, mind or process apart from the experiences and relations of the individual persons who constitue society. This is as true of religious experience as of any other experience. But, as Brightman says, "There are differences in the conscious interest and attention of the religious man. At certain times the individual is concerned primarily about his personal welfare, his own inner struggle, and his relations to God rather than to men. But at other times --- and they constitute the great bulk of life --- the religious individual is concerned with his relations to other human beings, either individuals or groups or institutions."[1] Thus any experience, religious or ordinary, is both individual and social.

This does not mean that a person has no personal or private religious life. It simply means that to divorce religion from society is to lose religion. "The personal and the social points of view are equally necessary; if either ignores the other, the result is a mutilated religion and a false philosophy --- false because one-sided and inadequate."[2] In the light of this our notions of the hostility of the 'individual gospel' and 'social gospel' are false. There can be no 'individual gospel' without

a 'social gospel' and no 'social gospel' without an 'individual gospel'. To hold these two as distinct and separate is to say that man is not a man.

If this be the case what then do we mean when we speak of personal religion? By personal religion we mean a religion in which personality plays the leading role. It is the religion of persons. It is a religion in which man through experience comes into personal relationship with the Divine Being and consequently with other personal beings. Personal religion is an experience of membership in the personal realm.

This religion must not be confused with higher forms of ethical theory or with humanitarianism. In the experience of God man realizes his insufficiency and his dependence upon God. As Brightman states, "Whatever else God may be, he at least symbolizes man's dissatisfaction with himself."[3] Personal religion is thus not merely a moral code which looks out for all individuals, it is a religion in which all individuals are to receive the highest possible advantages. All are to receive these advantages, not because it is the expedient thing to do, but because it is the only possible way --- it is of the nature of the personal realm --- that religion can be personal. A personal religion which favored one individual over another would not be a personal religion, in fact it would not be a true religion. All sons will be equal in the Kingdom of God. This does not mean that all will receive everything alike, that would not be equality. "The only true equality is inequality."

But this looks more like social religion than personal religion. True, it gives this appearance, but it is just this that makes it a true personal religion. Personal religion starts from personal individual experiences but it always expresses itself among persons. As a religion it

is vitally social.

C. Social Religion

If such is the nature of personal religion why has religion been so antisocial? The answer is obvious. Religion has been antisocial because it has not been truly personal. Too frequently religious men have regarded religion as something essentially private, something sacred which has nothing to do with human welfare as a whole. These men often thank God for His protecting care and forget that others of God's creatures are sinking lower in security. These religious persons seem to feel that the soul's concern with God has to do only with the eternal and invisible, not with the temporal and visible. They justify their ideas by saying that God is a sovereign Ruler and when He sees fit He will establish His Kingdom; it will be His Kingdom and His gift to man.

How do such ideas arise? Is there any truth in them? Brightman states that "these variously apparently antisocial phases of personal religion are signs of the truth that religion does not consist entirely of man's social relations to his fellow man. Religion at its highest is truly supersocial. It is faith in a reality on which all society and all nature depend."[4] We thus note that the social side of religion is only one phase of man's religious life. The belief in God is a social fact but God himself is not merely a social belief. God is a reality who although immanent in society is yet transcendent. God is a reality independent of human society. Consequently we must be on our guard and not conceive of God as simply a social phenomenon.

This is the dark or negative side of social religion, but it is not the only side; there is a bright or positive side. In our treatment

of personality we found that in order to be a person one had to take his place among other persons. In taking his place in this realm the individual found that he had certain obligations and duties toward the other members of this realm. We also found that it was through an adequate religious experience that the individual found his relation to his fellow beings. In this recognition of God we found Him to be a personal God, the creator and source of all personal beings. He consequently found himself to be not only physically but morally related to all other personal and moral beings.

Now the social problem is essentially the moral problem ans as such religion has an important pert to play in its solution. Attempts have been made, and perhaps will continue to be made, to solve the social problem apart from either religion or morality. These attempts have all proved false and must prove false because of the very nature of the personal and social realms. It will be only by the recognition of this fact that man will ever build any kind of a social system that will not lead to the exploitation of the less fortunate by the more fortunate. Only by our recognition of the Fatherhood of God and the Sonship, and thus Brotherhood, of man can we expect to build the Kingdom of God.

D. Summary

Man's personal nature is essentially religious and moral. In accepting this fact we find greater values not only in, but for, life. Life now takes on new meanings and finds new purposes. One can now see what Jesus meant when he said, "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." The reaches of this acceptance are wide spread, it favors no persons and no races or nations. Once this is fully understood the words of Micah's prophecy --- "they shall beat

their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning-hocks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. But they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig-tree; and none shall make them afraid" --- will be fulfilled.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 Leighton, J. A., Man and the Cosmos, p. 562
2 Brightman, E. S., Personality and Religion, p. 11
3 Buckham, J. W., Personality and the Christian Ideal, p. 17
4 Ibid., p. 21

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1 Whitehead, A. N., Adventures of Ideas, pp. 225-226
2 Ibid., pp. 229-230
3 McGilvary, E. B., Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, Vol. VI, p. 230
4 Leighton, J. A., Man and the Cosmos, p. 323
5 Buckham, J. W., Religion as Experience, p. 12
6 Leighton, J. A., Man and the Cosmos, p. 320
7 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 29
8 Buckham, J. W., Religion as Experience, p. 14
9 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 137
10 Leighton, J. A., Man and the Cosmos, p. 81

CHAPTER II

1 Brightman, E. S., Philosophical Review, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 557
2 Whitehead, A. N., Adventures of Ideas, p. 245
3 Howison, G. H., Limits of Evolution, p. 52
4 Ibid., p. 53
5 Hocking, W. E., The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 48
6 Edward, K., Religious Experience, pp. 204-205
7 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 297
8 Ibid., p. 291
9 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, pp. 165-166
10 Brightman, E. S., Personality and Religion, p. 53
11 Inge, W. R., Christian Mysticism, p. 5
12 Jones, R. M., Studies in Mystical Religion, p. xxvii
13 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 312
14 This method pushed to its extreme is called the via negativa which usually ends in complete identification with God or 'other-worldliness', and too frequently in asceticism.

15 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 319
16 Edwards, D. Miall, Hibbert Journal, Vol. 28, pp. 495-496
17 Otto, R., The Idea of the Holy, p. 5
18 Ibid., p. 15
19 Edwards, D. Miall, Hibbert Journal, Vol. 28, p. 495

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1 Palmer, G. H., The Nature of Goodness, p. 131
2 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 125
3 Mt. 25:40
4 Buckham J. W., Personality and the Christian Ideal, p. 111
5 Jacks, L. P., Elemental Religion, p. 53
6 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 125
7 See page 14 above
8 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 138
9 Leighton, J. A., Man and the Cosmos, p. 395
10 Tennant, F. R., Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 145
11 Leighton, J. A., Man and the Cosmos, p. 422
12 Kant, Selections, Edited by T. M. Greene, p. 309
13 Ibid., p. 302
14 Leighton, J. A., Man and the Cosmos, p. 426
15 Buckham, J. W., The Humanity of God, pp. 58-59
16 Buckham, J. W., Personality and the Christian Ideal, pp. 188-189
17 Buckham, J. W., The Humanity of God, p. 45
18 Leighton, J. A., Man and the Cosmos, p. 426
19 Buckham, J. W., The Humanity of God, pp. 208-209

CHAPTER IV

1 Brightman, E. S., Personality and Religion, p. 103
2 Ibid., p. 104
3 Ibid., p. 52
4 Ibid., p. 135

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